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The essay launches a constructivist explanation of the dynamic yet 
paradoxical interplay between what Joseph Weiler has termed 'decisional 
supranationalism' on the one hand and the 'constitutionalization' o f the legal 
sphere in the European Community on the other. The two dimensions hay*, 
constituted a theoretical puzzle for lawyers as well as for political scientists 
because they have described the integration process as moving in completely 
opposite directions. If one focuses on the political sphere alone, the EC was 
increasingly intergovernmentalized from the mid 1960's onwards and could 
thus best be characterized as a classical international organization. If we 
turn to the legal sphere of the Community on the other hand, the picture 
looks quite different. What we have witnessed here in the same period is a 
gradual but steady move from international to constitutional law.
With a point of departure in a critique of especially intergovenmentalisl 
approaches to European integration,this essay seeks to explain 'the logic' of 
this paradox by drawing on a sociological theory of institutional dynamics. 
The perspctive is primarily inspired by Anthony Giddens theory of 
structuration and historical institutionalism and seeks to incorporate an idea 
of rational action on behalf of the member states on the one hand, and the 





















































































































































































Europe Towards a Post-Hobbesian Order ?
A Constructivist Theory of European Integration
- or how to explain European Integration as an unintended 
consequence of rational state-action'.
"..the modern state is — finally — being undermined and 
overreached... What is supplementing and even replacing the old 
state system based on hierarchical command within each unit (at 
least in foreign affairs) and normative anarchy across them (at least, 
in principle) are new forms of order based on continuous 
negotiation, tacit consent, shifting arrangements, overlapping 
competencies, diffuse authorization and cooperative ventures that 
effectively obfuscates previous distinctions between levels of 
aggregation.However, the existence of this system has not yet 
succeeded in changing perceptions at the level of collective 
identification in mass publics, and it still seems incapable of 
convincing academics to revise their traditional concepts and 
categories of analysis". (Schmitter 1991 p. 16-17).
' This paper was first presented at the annual International Studies Association 
(ISA) Convention: Beyond Sovereignty', Chicago, Feb. 20-25/2 1995. A 
second draft o f the paper was put forward at the Workshop on 'Theory Synthesis 
in IR.: Problems and Possibilities'. European University Institute, Florence, 
March. 27 - 3 1995. Several later versions have been presented in seminars at 
EUI and in other international settings for instance in the Jean Monnet Lectures 
given at the University of Copenhagen in Nov.1994 and Nov.1995 and more 
recently, at a workshop at Harvard University in Dec. 1995. A forerunner for the 
essay has been published in Danish in a sociological journal, see (Wind 1994b). 
For comments on the present version of this essay I am especially indebted to 
Robert Keohane, Anne-Marie Slaughter, Alec Stone, Joseph Weiler, Francis 
Snyder, Paul Pierson, Susan Strange, Adrienne Héritier, Andrew Moravcsik, 
Vincenzo Ferrari, Berhard Giesen, Ole Wæver, George Ross, Torben Bundgârd- 
Pedersen, Kristian Kjeldsen, Lars Bo Kaspersen and members of theory-group 
on European Integration (CORE), University of Copenhagen. I would also like to 
thank the Working group on International Relations at the European University 




























































































"The study of laws is largely a science of norms; the study of politics is 
largely a science of how power is used"2. This almost trivial picture of 
the division of labour between lawyers and political scientists still holds 
strong as mental images within the two disciplines (Onuf 1989, 1994; 
Stone 1994; Weiler 1991). Equally so does the idea that norms and power 
belong to mutual exclusive spheres. Recently, however, legal scholars of 
European integration have noted that nowhere is the negligence of law - 
or taken more broadly 'institutions' by political scientists - more 
problematic than in European Community studies (Burley & Mattli 1993; 
Weiler 1991, 1994; Shapiro 1980, 1992; Dehousse 1989; Rasmussen 
1986). The problem is not so much a lack of interest in the formal 
institutional set up of the European Union as a fundamental ignorance of 
the impact of informal norm-constituting practices and 'institutional 
politics' on the overall integration process. One good excuse for this 
unalertness on behalf of international relations (IR.) scholars, could 
perhaps be detected to the classical paradigm-division in the IR.-field 
between realism and idealism^. The interparadigm debate that has framed 
the discipline throughout its rather short existence made especially IR.- 
theorists of the realist branch almost cynical towards the possible impact 
of law and institutions on international life in general. Two World Wars 
and the not very impressive performance of the International Court of 
Justice in the post-war years seemed only to legitimize this scepticism. 
However, with the lack of belief in institutions and the cultivation of the
2 See Stone( 1994:441).
3 For a conventional introduction to the inter-paradigm-debate in IR. see for 




























































































Hobbesian conception of power as 'the command of the sovereign’, 
followed an extremely impoverished understanding of the impact of 
normative institutional practices on social relations in general (Ashley 
1986 p. 291-92; Ruggie 1989, 1992; Kratochwil 1989; Onuf 1989; Wendt 
1987, 1992; see generally Foucault 1977). In other words, many IR.- 
theorists have come to link an emphasis on institutions with either 
apolitical organizational formalism or social cohesion and harmony of 
interests (Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986;Wind 1996a).
An important recent but far from unproblematic exception to the 
negligence of institutions in international relations theory is the 'co­
operation under anarchy’ literature based on assumptions from neo­
classical economics. In this literature international institutions certainly do 
play an important role moderating the gloomy realist world view where 
states are only concerned with their own survival. However, institutions as 
transaction-cost economics understand them, are not believed to have any 
autonomy or life of their own but merely function as solutions to 
collective action problems. Thus in their short and long-term design and 
persistence institutions are expected to mirror the calculated choices of 
those (state) actors that installed them. As I will argue below, however, 
borrowing from the economists when trying to understand the rather 
diffuse impact of institutions on political life in general, is not a very 
illuminating path to choose. As in the case of trying to comprehend 
European Integration, it might in fact be directly misleading.
In the present essay I am not so much interested in the formal 
influence of manifest institutions such as the Commission, the Parliament 




























































































integration in recent years. There has already been written bulks of books 
on this. The discussion will be more theoretical in the sense of trying to 
focus attention on the need for the development of a perspective that can 
grasp the informal and unanticipated consequences of institutional 
dynamics and their possible influence on actor perceptions of power as 
legitimacy over time. It will in other words be argued that in order to get 
a better grip of the current power-transformations in the European polity, 
theoretical innovation is needed. In section 4 and 5 of this essay an 
analytical framework is developed that takes institutional processes more 
seriously in the sense of giving them more explanatory autonomy than 
either neofunctionalism or any regime theory-approach. To stay in the 
jargon of IR.-theory, this - as 1 will name it 'constructivist approach’ - 
clearly belong in the so-called ’reflectivist’4 camp and is based mainly on 
the structuration theory of Anthony Giddens and ’new institutionalist’ 
organization theoryfsee Giddens 1979, 1985; Onuf 1989, 1994; March & 
Olsen 1984; 1989; DiMaggio & Powell 1991; Steinmo, Thelen & 
Longstreth 1992). The explicit purpose is to launch an analytical 
framework that is able to combine an emphasis of intentional/rational 
action on behalf of the agents involved (here the member states) and 
which at the same time takes account of the relative autonomy of
4 Throughout this essay I adopt R.Keohane’s - now - conventional distinction 
between a rationalist and a rellectivist understanding of institutions(see Keohane 
1988). The reflectivisl label as utilized by Keohane is. however, extremely broad 
and covers everything from hermeneutic approaches to post-structuralism. The 
constructivist approach as applied to international relations has been promoted by 
scholars like N.G Onuf 1989 and Wendt 1987, 1992, 1994. What constructivists 
have been especially known for is putting the agency-structure-problem at the 
centre of any analysis o f institutions in world politics. For a more in depth 
conceptualization of O nufs version of constructivism see Wind 1996a, 




























































































institutions and institutional practices as they develop over time. What I 
am interested in at the empirical level is the radical but among political 
scientists almost completely neglected impact of Community regulation - 
formal as well as informal - on member-state autonomy. My central claim 
is twofold; 1) firstly, that the penetration of community norms into the 
national legal sphere has gone much further than what was originally 
anticipated and wanted by the contracting states; 2) secondly, that this has 
reduced the national autonomy significantly and made the possibility of 
selective 'exit' from the Community practically (but perhaps not formally) 
impossible. These empirical insights are important in their own right, but 
the most important point in this context is that this empirical development 
will have tremendous consequences for our traditional theoretical 
perspectives for analyzing international cooperation. It thus no longer 
makes sense to study the EU-Polity as a strategic action-game where 'exit- 
options' is a basic - though often implicit assumption. This does not mean, 
however, that state strategies and bargains become uninteresting to 
analyze. States will continue to be important players. They will also 
continue to have strategies and interests and major bargains will still be 
important for conceiving of the direction of the integration-process.
Rather it implies that it no longer gives meaning to try to assess the 
overall development on the basis of bargain-outcomes where state- 
preferences are seen as exogenous to the normative context. States and 
state-actors have increasingly but - as I will try to show in the following - 
probably quite undeliberately come to endogenize (and made sense of) the 
new institutional rules of the EU-game in their own preference-formation 




























































































increasingly important - analytically - not only to assess the character and 
density of the institutional development but also the way in which 
institutional developments has taken on a 'life of its own'. I will thus try 
to demonstrate that such developments over time very often come to 
deviate significantly from initial state-choices.
A constructivist approach, in other words, makes it possible theoretically 
to integrate the intergovernmentalist emphasis of states pursuing 
objectives strategically while at the same time stressing the importance of 
the institutional dynamics of the integration process as such. Though this 
might sound as just a new version of neofunctionalism, this is far from the 
truth. As it will become clearer below, a constructivist perspective differs 
from neofunctionalism both in its microfoundation, its understanding of 
institutional change and in its overall explanatory framework.
Moreover, a perspective like the one outlined here make us capable of 
conceiving the outcome of European integration differently than what has 
been possible by either intergovernmentalist or neofunctionalist 
approaches. Both have foreclosed any idea of change away from the 
territorial state because of the predetermination inherent in the ontological 
assumptions of these theories. Put differently, only two end-stages would 
fit nicely into the 'well-ordered' world we know already: The EU will 
either be a traditional intergovernmentalist organization or end up as a 
federal construct of some kind. Territory and power will, it is assumed, 
stay in the familiar symbiosis that has characterized the European state- 
system for about 500 years.
The constructivist conceptualization of the developments in Europe 




























































































launched by traditional approaches but perhaps also much more likely. It 
does not predict what Europe will end up like but will provide a 
framework that gives room for outcomes that transcend conventional 
thinking.
1.2 Two Propositions
1.2.1. By emphasizing market failure, incomplete contracting and 
equilibrium-outcomes when explaining CO-operation between states, 
contemporary rationalist approaches to world politics have endorsed a 
very narrow understanding of institutional dynamics. In the first part of 
this essay it is argued that when applied to the recent developments in the 
EU-integration process, the rationalist approach seems even more 
problematic for two main reasons: 1) Its individualistic ontological 
assumptions adopted from neo-classical economics are unable to account 
for any possible unintended constraints on state 'choices' over time and of 
changes in interests and preferences resulting from institutional processes. 
2) A rationalist conception of institutions is intimately linked to an 





























































































Intergovernmentalists hold that there is nothing distinct about the 
European Union (EU) compared to other international organizations. This 
means that the rationalist vision of institutions as merely reducing 
transacuon costs and providing an environment for states to get 
information about other states' preferences in a world without a 
Leviathan, can be applied directly to the European case. Moreover, the 
radonalist/intergovernmentalist perspective will have an inbuild 
unwillingness to accept that any significant transfers of power from the 
member-states to the EU institutions or other actors can ever occur. The 
game theoretical metaphor and the individualist microfoundations adopted 
in the rationalist literature would simply crumble if the assumption of the 
state as an autonomous 'cost-benefit' controlling actor in any given 
bargaining-process, was ever quesuoned. Rational-institutionalists do 
accept that state-sovereignty can be pooled in some issue areas, but this 
does not conflict with the basic contention that such a 'pooling' always will 
be a result of deliberate and calculable choice. Taken together these 
propositions suggest that there will be an intimate relationship between the 
rational perspective's prior commitments to individualist 
microfoundations and its predictions of the outcome of the European 
integration process.
1.2.2. The inability of conventional perspectives to transcend traditional 
analytical categories - is, however unsatisfactory when looking at 
European politics today. This holds, 1 would argue, not just for a 
neorealist approach with its gloomy prospects for the European project 




























































































as I call it here 'rational-institutionalism'. On the other hand, it does not 
seem that the classical antipole of intergovernmentalist position, 
neofunctionalism, is the best place to look for a less deterministic and 
more innovative institutional perspective. Though giving more leeway to 
especially supranational institutions, this perspective is, with its fixation on 
interest-groups maximizing their individual utility, just as the rationalist 
perspective giving too little, if any, importance to the often quite 
unpredictable logic of institutional dynamics. In spite of 
neofunctionalism's focus on manifest institutions such as the Commission, 
the Parliament - and to a lesser extend the European Court of Justice, it 
leaves too little room for the 'trial-and - error logic' of institutions. 
Neofunctionalism is furthermore build on a modernization vision of 
societal progress and harmony of interests. The theory's prediction of 
progressive spill-over mechanisms left no room for power, inefficiency, 
institutional slack and unanticipated effects in general. As the most recent 
organization theory has taught us, however, institutional developments as 
well as much political decision-making is more often a product of 
'chance', appropriate and habitual reasoning on behalf of the actors 
involved, than of calculable strategic choice.
Consequently, the outcome of political bargaining as well as institutional 
interrelations between agents and structures, is very frequently based on 
after-rationalization and adaptation, that is, of making sense of and 
legitimizing more or less unforseeable dynamics.
So far, however, no coherent alternative approach building on these 
insights have been put forward within the IR.-field. Reflectivist IR- 




























































































deconstructive and unable to come up with any systematic research agenda 
of their own. They have also been criticized for lacking microfoundations. 
Whether this is a correct judgement or not will not be my concern here. 
What I will try to offer is, at least a sketch of a more constructive and 
even 'constructivist' analytical framework to the study of 'European 
Transformation' - to borrow a phrase from Joseph Weiler(Weiler 1991). 
The aim will be two-tracked. l)Firstly, after a demonstration of the main 
insufficiencies of the rationalist approach to the study of European 
integration (section 3), the aim (section 4) will be to show that by 
adopting a more sociological approach to institutions one will arrive at a 
more, as it were, 'realistic' (but also much more messy) picture of how - 
agents and structures interact in formal as well as informal institutional 
settings. I will here draw on literature that - though it might seem exotic 
from a rationalist IR.-theorist's point of departure - has become 
mainstream in fields like comparative politics, organization theory, 
political theory, sociology and even law. 2) Secondly, this more 
sociological understanding of institutions also provides a theory of change 
in social systems in general and of actor-identities over time. Compared to 
the two classical IR.-approaches to European integration referred to 
above, the perspective developed here will be much more open to 
detecting unconventional outcomes of the current changes.
The empirical relevance of a constructivist theory for grasping the 
fluctuating power-structures in Europe in recent years will as indicated 
above be illustrated (section 5) with an explication of the rather 
paradoxical development of European legal integration from 1960-1970 




























































































Joseph Weiler's observations about the contrary dynamics in the legal and 
political-decisional spheres in this period. Put very briefly, Weiler argues 
that up until the Single Act in 1986, one could observe a parallel 
'intergovernmentalization' of the decision-making processes in the Council 
on the one hand and a normative constitutionalizing process in the legal 
institutional sphere on the other. The two developments were not linked in 
any direct causal way, but the development in the one sphere might very 
well have had an indirect effect on the developments in the other.
My point here is that this paradox cannot be explained or even 
conceptualized within a rational institutionalist framework, where only 
inter-state bargaining is considered important. Nor can it easily be 
explained in a simple interest-model based on neofunctionalism as some 
writers have recently suggested. By applying sociological theory - here 
primarily Giddens' theory of transformation in social systems - to Weilers 
observations, however, it becomes possible to explain the 
constitutionalization process as an unintended consequence of what was 
initially a rational state attempt to preserve full national autonomy. One 
can put it slightly different in saying that what was originally by the 
member-states seen as a deliberate and conscious attempt to gain security 
and economic prosperity through a controlled integration process over 
time, unintentionally made the states themselves co-producers of a 
normative institutional structure that has resulted in an irreversible 
'closure of exit'. This has not and will with very little likeness lead to a 
European Suprastate of any kind but has changed the character of the 




























































































relevance of intergovernmentalist approaches based on rational-choice 
assumptions has become fundamentally obsolete.
Unlike neofunctionalist integration theory this constructivist perspective 
still finds it meaningful to see the main actors as states. 1 thus agree with 
intergovernmentalism in the assumption that states are highly concerned 
with not loosing control over the EU policy process. My point is, 
however, that when looking at especially the development in the legal 
sphere of the Community the past 25 years, the assumption of state- 
control is and has been an illusion. State sovereignty has gradually been 
undermined and the transfer of power to the Community through the 
evolution of the aquis Coummunitaire is practically irreversible.
A central argument of the perspective adopted here is that the 
gradual transitions that we will have to look for first and foremost have to 
do with changes in power as legitimacy. While a static bargaining theory 
might be able to tell us something about who has how much material 
power in a concrete decision making process, a constructivist would try to 
trace the changes in the legitimacy of institutional practices. Who has 'the 
right to rule' at a given point in time and why, how does this right change 
7
John Ruggie summarizes the complex situation in Europe these years in 
the following manner:
"Take., the EC, in which the process of unbundling territoriality has 
gone further than anywhere else...it may constitute the first 
'multiperspectical polity’ to emerge since the advent of the modern 
era. That is to say, it is increasingly difficult to visualize the conduct 




























































































considerable measure even domestic politics, as though it took place 
from twelve separate, single fixed view points. Nor can models of 
strategic interaction do justice to this particular feature of the EC, 
since the collectively of members as a singularity, in addition to the 
central institutional apparatus of the EC, has become party to the 
strategic interaction game. To put it differently, the constitutive 
process whereby each of the twelve defines their own identity and 
identities are logically prior to preferences —increasingly endogenize 
the existence of the other eleven..There is no indication, however, that 
this remaining will result in a federal state of Europe—which would 
merely replicate on a larger scale the typical modern political 
form”(Ruggie 1992 p.171-172).
3. The Limitations of Rationalism
"Achieving cooperation is difficult in world politics. There is no 
common government to enforce rules, and by the standards of 
domestic society, international institutions are weak. Cheating and 
defection are endemic"(Keohane & Axelrod 1985 p.226).
A critical assessment of the rational-institutionalist perspective on 
European integration/co-operation implies focusing on some specific 
metatheoretical problems that are explicitly related to this position's 
individualistic understanding of institutions. My claim as set out in the 




























































































grasp the recent dynamics of European integration because rationalists do 
not take institutions seriously enough.
The merging of the former rivalling realist and liberalist IR.- 
paradigms into one rational-institutionalist research-program in the 1980s, 
was unintentionally prepared for by Kenneth Waltz’s extremely 
parsimonious neorealist theory in 1979. Even though Waltz’s original 
ambition was to promote a structural theory of international politics, 
several reviewers and critiques of his theory made explicit, that his 
assumptions about atomism and self-help' in the international system, 
were based on an utilitarist and individualist ontology(see Ashley 
1986;Wendt 1987,1992)5. In fact, Waltz makes this clear himself by 
referring to microeconomic theory throughout his book and explicitly 
compares the balance of power-system with the theory of equilibrium in 
neo-classical economic theory(see Waltz 1979 p.54-55, 72-74, 89-94,118). 
As noted by John Ruggie in his critical review of Waltz's 1979-book in 
1983:"...the international system is formed...like a market: it is 
individualistic in origin, and more or less spontaneously generated as a 
by-product of the actions of its constitutive units"(Ruggie 1986(83) 
p. 134)6. ^ was in other words, the parsimony and basic assumptions of
 ̂ As Waltz puts it: " Balance-of-power theory is micro-theory precisely in the 
economist’s sense. The system, like the market in economics, is made by actions 
and interactions of the units, and the theory is based on assumptions about their 
behaviour". Waltz (1979: 118).
6 Alexander Wendt has put it this way: "Waltz seems to be a holist. but in fact he 
treats the self regarding identities and interests o f stales as given prior to 
interaction...by taking the properties of his units of analysis as given and not 
addressing how these are produced by interaction. Waltz’ theory is based on de 
facto individualism (whether or not intended as such), one in which the structure 
of identities and interests that constitute that particular kind of anarchy within 
which competitive power-seeking behaviour is learned is theoretically primitive, 
and which does not change as a result of systemic process. It is this de facto 




























































































Waltz's ‘Theory of International Politics’ that cleared the ground for an - 
ontologically speaking - individualist based synthesis between former 
realist and liberalist rivals - resulting in the regime-theoretical - or as 1 
prefer to call it: 'the a rational-institutionalist research program'(Wsever 
1992,1994;Kratochwil & Ruggie 1986; Wind 1993, 1996b). When applied 
to the EC this leads - not very surprisingly - to an intergovernmentalist 
approach. Because rational-institutionalists adopt a neorealist 
understanding of international politics as the basis for analysis 
characterized by a vision of the international system as an atomist 
anarchy, states face an eternal collective action problem. Consequently, a 
rationalist conception of the EC institutional environment is equivalent to 
the way economists in general conceive of institutions - as a voluntarily 
established, facilitating system in which otherwise self-regarding actors 
can pursue their individual interests (Moravcsik 1991, 1993a; Garrett; 
Garrett & Weingast 1991; see generally Oye (eds.) 1986 and Baldwin 
(eds.) 1993)7. James Caporaso has summarized the synthesis and general 
ontology of rational-institutionalism in the following manner:
"...the fundamental contribution of regime theory is to move
realism (if it is still realism) out of its zero-sum world and to use
economic theorizing". Wendt (1992c: 182); see also Wendt & Duvall (1989 :55). 
David Dessler makes the point in this way: "In the ontology of Waltz' approach, 
the unit precedes the system and through interaction generates structure. Of 
course, in Waltz's causal explanatory scheme, structure is seen as constraining 
and disposing state action, and in this sense it can be said that the arrangement 
'leads to' (moulds, limits, shapes, and shoves) the interaction. Bur ontologically 
speaking, it is the interaction that creates the structure". D. Dessler(1989: 449). 
My emphasis. See also the debate on this issue between Wendt and Hollis & 
Smith in Review of international Studies vol. 18 1992.
7 Several of the articles published in 10 in this period am collected in Oye: See K. 




























































































the theory of games to ask what kinds of arrangements (institutional 
arrangements) actors would devise under different types of 
incentives. The approach is clearly and unapologetically state- 
centred, self-interested, and methodologically individualist. It does 
not explain co-operation or institution-building as emanations of 
'community goodwill', common values, shared loyalties, or 
collective identities. Instead it wants to explain outcomes, including 
institutional outcomes as products of self-interested calculations. In 
short, regime theory strives to provide a micro basis for 
international institutions"(Caporaso 1993b p.482).
As Duncan Sindal has put it: "What is fundamental to strategic analysis is 
not the specific subject matter of military or economic issues, but a basic 
conception of how we understand politics among states"(Sindal 1985 
p.25). It can hardly be expressed in clearer terms.
Following this understanding, the EU is regarded as a regime-like 
organization providing - as argued by Stanley Hoffmann in 1982:" a set of 
norms of behavior and of rules and policies facilitating agreement among 
the members”(Hoffmann 1982 p.33). The same point of departure is taken 
by the majority of more recent publications on the EU and here it is not 
assumed that what Hoffmann called 'norms of behavior' in themselves, 
over time, will have any impact what-so-ever on the shaping of states' 
identity and interests(se genrally Moravcsik 1991, 1993a: Garrett 1992; 
Grieco 1991; Weber & Wiesmeth 1991; Taylor 1991; Sbragia (eds.) 1992; 
Lange 1993 and others).
There are, however, several problems with invoking such a perspective to 
the study of European integration (or as intergovernmentalist prefer to 




























































































institutions i.e. the Commission, the Court and the Parliament to some 
kind of residual categories which - as just indicated - are understood to 
have no or at least an insignificant independent impact on influencing 
state-interest over time, initiating policy-formulation etc. But the EC 
decision-making environment is also attributed very little significance for 
agenda-setting.
This is obviously in clear contrast with neofunctionalism which sees 
especially the Commission as an important player - not only for agenda­
setting but also for convincing, as it were, the states about their 'true' 
interests(Dehousse & Majone 1993; Sandholtz & Zysman 1989, 
Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991 )8. 1 will get back to some of these critical 
points below, however, as noted in the introduction my critique of 
rational-institutionalism in this context will not focus on the importance 
of manifest EC-institutions. What 1 will try to emphasize here is rather the 
implications of not giving credit to the deeper institutional processes 
produced in formal as well as informal regulations and in day-to-day 
practices. Lawyers normally call this the aquis communautare when 
talking about the EU.
More generally, what characterizes the literature that conceives of 
the EC or EU as a traditional international organization or a functional 
regime, is that the it is conceptualized as a facilitator and efficiency- 
arrangement that can help otherwise self-regarding states to obtain 
strategically defined national goals by the reduction of transaction 
costs(see generally Krasner (eds.) 1983;Keohane 1984; Oye 1986; Grieco
8 Dehousse and Majone do not, however, label themselves neofunctionalists even 
though they see neofunctionalism as providing the most convincing explanation of 




























































































1990; Rittberger ed. 1993; Lange 1992. 1993)9. The EU-institutional set­
up is, in the rational-institutionalist research-program, seen to function as 
an arena in which states with fixed interests enter into in order to obtain a 
better bargaining position by gathering information about other states' 
preferences(Weber & Wiesmeth 1991 p.259; Moravcsik 1993; Garrett 
1992 p.533ff; see also Cameron 1992 p. 28ff). It is at least partly in this 
way that the EU can be seen to 'strengthen the state’ as Moravcsik has 
recently argued(Moravcsik 1993, 1994)10. Following this line of 
argument, the explanation for the co-ordinated opening of internal market 
in 1992 can thus, as Garrett has argued, be seen as an efficient solution to 
a collective action problem where the basic problem is always the 
following: "All states would benefit from co-operative arrangements, but 
there are powerful incentives for individual states to defect"(Garrett 1992 
p. 533).
The incentive to defect is of course assumed (rather than empirically 
proven) from the image of world politics as an anarchy where states 
eternally seek prominence vis-à-vis other actors in the system.
9 This follows from the famous Chicago-school- Coase-theorem. As long way 
back as 1937 Ronald Coase pointed to the fact that market-exchange doesn't 
always work so smoothly as expected for a market with perfect competition, 
information and so on. It is more often the case that all kinds of cost follow  
exchange. Not just because of lack o f information but because of cost 
accompanying implementation and for instance, sanctions systems (a missing 
Leviathan) to take care of monitoring and to some extend sanctioning. See R. 
Coase(1960).
10 The argument A. Moravcsik puts forward is of course much more complex in 
that he launches a model that can integrate domestic politics and international 
bargaining. However, this is not important for my argument here where my focus 
is on the possible changes in preferences and interest at the international level 
itself. At this level Moravcsik's image of state to state relations is just as static 
and predictable as those rationalist regime theorists who have shown little interest 
in incorporating domestic politics into the analysis. See A. Moravcsik (1993); and 




























































































Consequently, defection and free-riding is taken to be the most 'rational' 
strategy to choose for the individual state at any given point in time. This 
makes it possible (at least so long as not everybody defects !) to benefit 
from a collective good without contributing to it (see generally Olson 
1965). The regime-literature in other words, also relies on the theory of 
market exchange familiar to neo-classical economics where the story 
unfolds like this: Firms in a free market (in 1R. firms are of course 
replaced by states without an international Leviathan) pursuing wealth and 
power. However, the pursuit of self-interest by all will lead to Pareto- 
inferior outcomes in the market as such and equilibria solutions will be 
almost impossible to obtain. This creates a need for arbitration through 
institutions. Or as Keohane has put it: "there will be a demand for 
regimes"(Keohane in Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984). The collective action 
problem - and its solution in an EU context - can thus be summarized in 
this manner: "Even if the distribution of interests across states revealed 
potential gains from exchange, many opportunities would be missed due to 
poor information, lack of trust, incentives to defect, uncertainty regarding 
the duration of a contract, and ease of escaping detection if contracts are 
broken"(Comett & Caporaso 1992 p. 226). However, if iterated games in 
an enduring environment are introduced, that is, if one co-operation-game 
is repeated and if the time-horizon for the interaction is extended, more 
stable co-operation might in fact be possible(see Axelrod 1984). The 
unique about the EU is exactly - so the argument goes - that it provides 
the states with an enduring institutional structure and even with a 
sanctioning-arrangement (the European Court of Justice (ECJ)) that 




























































































Weingast 1993). In purely co-operative games the efficiency is increased 
for all due both to the extension of the time-frame, and the adoption of 
linkage-strategies. In other words, the EU's well-developed institutional 
structure makes it possible to organize side-payments to 'losers’ in a 
specific bargain(Weber & Wiesmeth 1991 p.258). Rationalists for instance 
see the EU-structural funds in this light where well-off countries buy 
votes from less well-off countries through subsidies* *. In non-cooperative 
games - understood as policy-areas with greater political sensibility - so- 
called 'lowest-common denominator solutions' will be the most frequent 
outcome(see Moravcsik 1993; Krasner 1992).
A big advantage of adopting a rational institutionalist and thereby 
intergovernmentalist approach to European politics is quite clearly that it 
makes it possible to invoke theories of institutions and state-action that are 
applicable to IR.-theorizing in general. Put differently, theorizing about 
the EC from this perspective emphasizes some theorists’ reluctance with 
theories that have conceived of regional integration in Europe as 
something (historically) unique. Carole Webb put it this way;
"Intergovernmentalism..denies the uniqueness of the EC as a 
framework for international co-operation..it denies that the national 
political and economic systems of Europe are so interdependent and 
so penetrated by the Communities that governments cease to be sole 
arbiters of their country’s external fortune., the pluralist image of 
the network of participants in the EC's policy process is rejected in 
favour of a more conventional picture of governments carefully




























































































aggregating domestic positions at the national leveI"(Webb 1977 p. 
17-18)12.
Moravcsik, in particular, has stressed the concern for general theory by 
striving to formulate a generalizable framework that transcends time and 
space, a well-known aspiration of all positivist social science. Moravcsik 
puts his version of this goal in the following way: "Liberal 
Intergovemmentalism assimilates the EC to models of politics potentially 
applicable to all states, thereby specifying the conditions under which a 
similar process of integration may occur elsewhere" (Moravcsik 1993b p. 
519; for a critique see Matlary 1994 p.7ff, 1993; Wind 1996b, 1997)'3. 
Quite clearly, such an analytical framework leaves little room for even 
imagining a future decoupling of power and territory.
For the rationalist-institutionalists as for anyone else occupied with 
European politics since the 1980's however, the speeding up of the 
integration process has given rise to new speculations about how we as 
analysts can make sense of these intensified dynamics. What was it, in 
other words, that all of a sudden gave the process new fuel - not only with 
the adoption of the SEA in the mid-1980's and the opening of the internal 
market in 1992 - in spite of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the 
liberation of the Eastern European states ? *
*2 Here quoted from Mailary ibid.
13 J. Haaland Mallary has recently - rallier sarcastically - noted the following 
consequences of doing away with history: 'There is a logical connection between 
how one chooses to conceptualize the EC and one’s theoretical ambition. If one 
chooses IG (iniergovernmentalist MW) assumptions the ambition to arrive at 
generally applicable theory is inherent in these assumptions: the stale is an actor 
like any state, the EC but a regime with the same theoretical status as any other 





























































































The breaking up of the EU structures and resumed rivalry between the 
European powers as foreseen by neorealists like Mersheimer has not come 
to pass - at least not so far(Mersheimer 1990; for a critique see 
Kratochwil 1993a). We are, in other words, impelled to ask the question: 
why is it that states - voluntarily co-operate and eventually give away 
certain powers to a supranational organization like the EU - including the 
acceptance of majority ruling in several issue areas and continued 
autonomous power to the ECJ ? As I will argue subsequently, taking a 
conventional Hobbesian state of nature as a point of departure - as do both 
rational insdtutionalists and more hard-headed (neo)realists - leaves a lot 
to be explained. What I am getting at here is the contention launched in 
the introduction to this essay, that the ontological point of departure of 
rational- institutionalism (and neorealism) - anarchy and maximization of 
state interests, puts very narrow limits, not only to what we as analysts can 
see 'out there', but also to what we should be concerned with when 
looking at integration in Western Europe today 14.
Clearly, from an intergovernmentalist point of view neofunctionalists 
have highly overestimated both the independent influence of the 
Commission and of personalities like for instance Jacques Delors when 
analyzing European integration(Moravcsik 1991,1993a). Even though 
Moravcsik grants the Commission a certain impact on the speed of 
negotiating the SEA in the mid-80's, the final result, he argues, reflected
14 An important exception would be Krasner's sovereignty-article from 1988.
Here Krasner recognizes the reflective-institutionalist critique of the rationalist's 
adherence to microeconomic theory. However Krasner has not pursued this line 
of investigation in his later works. Quite the contrary. See for instance his work 
on 'Global Communications and National Power' from 1992 where a hard-line 
realist stance in the ongoing debate between neorealists and neoliberalists about 




























































































the converging interests of the major states with the lowest denominator- 
outcome(Moravcsik 1991 p. 47-48). Agreeing with scholars like Alan 
Milward and Paul Taylor, Moravcsik contends that:"..the unique 
institutional structure of the EC is acceptable to the national governments 
only insofar as it strengthens, rather than weakens, their control over 
domestic affairs, permitting them to attain goals otherwise 
unachievable"(Moravcsik 1993a p. 507). This is certainly clear talk. In 
other words, states are not only expected by all available means to try to 
maximize their self-interest but it is also expected that they will be able to 
monitor and thereby control the integration process very carefully. In the 
rational world vision states are free to choose between exit, voice and 
loyalty at all stages. In section 5 in particular this contention will be 
examined - and indeed questioned.
Also the EC legal framework is regarded by the rational-institutionalists 
as a neutral voluntarily installed sanctioning structure - a semi Leviathan - 
that, in everybody’s long-term interests, is given certain limited powers to 
punish transgressors of EC law and regulation(Moravcsik 1993a p. 513; 
Garrett 1992 p. 533,558,Garrett & Weingast 1991; Garrett 1995). With 
the point of departure in functional regime-theory, Garrett & Weingast 
argue that the power given to the ECJ is an expression of calculated 
interest on behalf of the member-states. EC-states do have shared goals, 
but they are unable to foresee all future problems and uncertainties 
involved in obtaining these because of fear of a.m.. free-riding. Therefore 
they have an incentive in empowering a neutral(!) agent such as the ECJ to 
enforce and police agreements'5. Moravcsik and Garrett do admit that the




























































































European Court of Justice has developed powers that go beyond what is 
'minimally necessary to perform its functions’, as Moravcsik puts it. As 
noted by Matlary, Moravcsik, in fact, see the development of the ECJ's 
power as an 'anomaly' because it - he must admit - does have rather 
significant independent powers that do not fit nicely into his 
intergovemmentalist world view (Matlary 1994 p. 19). At the end of the 
day, however, Moravcsik and Garrett reject that the legal framework can 
be said to threaten the sovereignty of the member states. On the basis of 
one single case, Garrett even goes as far as to say that the ECJ simply 
reflects the interests of the major powers(Garrett 1992, 1995 see also 
Taylor 1991 p. 121; Garrett & Weingast 1991; compare Burley & Mattli 
1993; Snyder 1993b; Shapiro 1992; Rasmussen 1986, 1994)16. As Burley 
& Mattli have underlined in their revealing article on the political impact 
of the ECJ, this contention is, however, directly wrong. The truth is that 
in several cases the governments of major countries argued fiercely 
against the Court's position(Burley & Mattli 1993 p. 50-51). I will get 
back to the question of how to evaluate the political impact of the legal 
process in section 5.
One of the most crucial problems with the rational-institutionalist 
perspective is thus not just that it leaves out the impact of significant 
institutional dynamics, but also that the explanation of state 
interest/preference formation stays exogenous to the EC-decision-making 
process. This point is well made by Wayne Sandholtz when he notes that: 
"..the intergovemmentalist argument implies that states form their 
preferences via some hermetic national process, then bring their interests *




























































































to Brussels"(Sandholtz 1993 p.3)17. it is, in other words, not until after 
state-interest is established and fixed, that the analysis of the international 
process is taken into consideration. Thus, in the bargaining process itself 
nothing is assumed to happen. State-interests and self-perceptions stay the 
same, or put differently, in the rational regime literature an 
endogenization of interest-formation - on the international level - is in fact
impossible^.
The impossibility of incorporating changes in interests over time at the 
international level as a consequence of the density and slack in the 
institutional environment as well as in the decision making processes is, 
however, not merely a problem for functional regime theory. It is equally 
obvious in the literature working with theories of two-level 
games(Putnam 1988). I will leave out any in depth discussion of such 
recent attempts by some rationalist scholars to improve functional regime 
theory by trying to incorporate domestic politics into the analysis of 
international bargaining. Still, domestic politics clearly matters when 
states formulate (and change !) their interests, but the question is exactly 
whether more sophisticated game theoretical models are what we should 
be looking for in trying to get better insights into European politics today 
? In other words, is politics in Europe hastily approaching the year 2000, 
really organized in such a nicely organized two-step manner as recently 
suggested by Moravcsik and other IR.-scholars ? I for one have my 
doubts. It does not seem to me that any viable solution to the problem of *
*7 See also Wallace, Wallace & Webh (eds.), (1977).
For a discussion of this problem in the rational choice-literature in sociology 




























































































integrating domestic politics will be found as long as we do not dare to 
abandon the sharp divide between domestic and international politicsffor 
an alternative approach see Olsen 1995a & b; Burley 1993 p.125-157; 
Bundgaard-Pedersen 1995; K. E Jprgensen 1996 ed. forthcoming). As 
noted by Matlary who quotes David Cameron:" ...foreign and domestic 
policies (in the EU) become increasingly intertwined because national 
political leaders, in negotiating among themselves within the Community, 
are simultaneously making foreign policy and domestic policy"(Cameron 
in Matlary 1994 p. 20). More generally, following March & Olsen's 
'Rediscovering Institutions' and their garbage can models', the pluralist 
image of political decision-processes taking place in nice and simple 
interest aggregating sequences is far from the messiness of real-world 
policy-formulation - no matter whether situated at the national or 
international leveKMarch & Olsen 1989 p. 12; more on this in section 4; 
see also Peters 1992; Bundgaard-Pedersen 1995). Several empirical 
studies show that the density and frequency of decision-processes at the 
European level makes the image of two - level games look more like 
'wishful thinking' on behalf of those scholars favouring the simplicity of 
formal modelling, than real-life' politics:
"..the interaction state-EC is much more complex than a two-level 
game..It seems increasingly unlikely that the state as a unitary actor 
should be able to play such a 'game' in a calculated manner, which 
means that it should be able to take into account the interplay 
between itself and a host of other actors at several levels. The 
complexity of the 'two-level' metaphor, which was argued to be its 





























































































And as Matlery continues: ”..as long as there is no dynamic theory of how 
interests are modified or even initiated one is hard pressed to find out 
exactly how the states and the EU interact in the sense that the perception 
of states' interests is influenced by the existence and importance of the EC, 
and vice versa. Even if one grants that the actors in IG 
(intergovernmentalist approaches MW) take into account the likely 
strategies and strengths of other actors (EC, other states) when they 
formulate their own, once formulated, the strategies remain 
static"(Matlary ibid, p.22; see also Wendt 1992 p.394-398).
One can certainly question the relevance of such a simplistic perspective 
when one is dealing with the EU today. Several empirical findings direct 
our attention to the fact that power is no longer preserved in a nicely 
demarcated territory. Not much suggests on the other hand, that what we 
can envisage on the horizon is a new, territorially state on the European 
level, either. The problem with the rational-institutionalist perspective is 
thus not just its static and atomist understanding of the state and of what 
actually goes on in international co-operation but- as noted above - also 
its inability to conceptualize any changes in power and identity between 
different actors and institutions over time(see also Katzenstein 1990)19. 
One could of course argue that this doesn't matter because this wasn’t 
what the rationalist perspective set out to explain. Such a respond is 
however fundamentally flawed. The point is exactly that the
19 "..international conflict and co-operation do not result from a process open to 
reductionist logic of analysis that takes interests as given. Instead the preferences 
of actors are changed by historical experience as are their views of how the world 




























































































intergovernmentalists claim to be able to explain - not just the bargains - 
but integration as such.
In the remaining part of my analysis I will keep states as main actors. As 
noted in the introduction this does not mean that I will stick to a realist - 
and indeed legal formalist - conception of sovereignty. As will become 
much clearer as we proceed, there is quite a difference between those 
rationalist analysts who work with states as atomist entities pursuing fixed 
goals and which have interests and preferences given prior to interaction 
on the one hand, and those analysts who emphasize the reciprocal 
interplay of agents, institutional processes and historically produced 
meaning-structures, on the other(see also Matlary 1993; 1995). What a 
constructivist perspective implies is that instead of letting state-interests 
and preferences be given by assumption, 'goals, strategies, and 
preferences', as Thelen & Steinmo argue, are exactly what need to be 
explained: "..unless something is known about the context, broad 
assumptions about 'self-interested behavior' are empty", as they put it:
"..we would not have trouble with the rational choice idea that 
political actors are acting strategically to achieve their ends. But 
clearly it is not very useful simply to leave it at that. We need a 
historically based analysis to tell us what they are trying to 
maximize and why they emphasize certain goals over 
others"(Thelen & Steinmo 1992 p. 9).
This is not enough, however. In order to get an idea of how changes in 
power and legitimacy take place in social systems, we also need a better 




























































































unintended consequences of these strategies. As I will illustrate in the 
following section, Anthony Gidden's theory of social change as an 
unintended consequence of rational action, can, in fact help us with that. 
Friedrich Kratochwil has argued over and over again, that this implies 
that we would have to recognize the crucial importance of what he calls 
'institutional facts' when assessing meaningful social interaction. This 
position can be seen as the first important step towards taking institutions 
seriously:
"The difference between a world of institutional facts (i.e. rules, 
norms and discursive and non-discursive practices MW) and that 
of brute or observational facts is well brought out by imagining how 
we would have to explain a football game in the language of 
observational facts alone. We would keep a statistical record of how 
many clusters we observed, how the periodic circular clustering is 
always followed by linear ordering and wild running over the field 
but..no matter how much data of this sort we imagine our 
observers to collect and no matter how many inductive 
generalizations we imagine them to make from the data, they still 
have not described American football..What is missing are all those 
concepts such as touchdown, offside, game points, time-out etc..the 
institutional facts, can only be explained in terms of the 
constitutive rules that underlie them"(Kratochwil 1989 p.27).
To sum up, the rational-institutionalist position in its different versions, 
regards institutions as purposive- efficiency arrangements installed to 
solve collective action problems. Whether formal or informal, 
institutions are not seen as having even relative autonomy. When they are 




























































































social action. As we shall see below this vision of institutions is closely 
connected to a traditional Hobbesian conception of power that penetrates 
almost all traditional IR.-theory (as well as positivist legal theory). Power 
is here understood to be related directly to formal sanction and 
compliance mechanisms and there is no room for a more subtle normative 
conception of power. As will be argued both in the section to follow and 
in the concluding section 5, such conceptions of power are, however, 
fundamentally flawed when it comes to conceiving of changes in 
legitimacy. And changes in such parameters are exactly what we will have 
to look for when analysing European politics at present.
4. Towards a Constructivist Conception of Institutions
"Political scientists steeped in the power-oriented perspectives of 
realism or trained in the empirical methodologies of behaviourism 
tend to dismiss any emphasis on the role of institutions as a 
vestige of the discredited ideas of the formal, legal, institutional 
school of thought...Mainstream economists, proud of the 
formalizations of neoclassical economics....generally ignore 





























































































4 . 1 Integrating Agency and Structure
Within large parts of social science disciplines in recent years, there has 
been an increasing awareness of the problems with explanatory 
frameworks that are based on either narrow actor or structure 
assumptions20. in some disciplines this debate has gone under the label 
'the agent-structure’ debate or 'The Micro-Macro-link'. In others, for 
instance in comparative politics and organization-theory, the label has 
been 'new institutionalism’ and in law it is called 'law in context' and 
'autopoetic law'. Apart from their differences and different points of 
origin, these approaches share a common dissatisfaction with the 
conception of institutions as represented by rational-institutionalists above. 
Reaching back to my introductory comment on the lack of interest in 
norms and institutions by political scientists, the constructivist position 
sketched in this section certainly rebuts that picture. However, it has not as 
yet reached the mainstream of international relations. This essay can be 
seen as an attempt to further this process.
20\yhat 1 am thinking of here is for instance J. March & J.P Olsens 
’Rediscovering Institutions from 1989. representing organization theory and 
overall political science. In Comparative politics see Steinmo, Thelen & 
Longstreth 1992 for a general introduction. In sociology bulks of work is 
concerned with these issues and it would be completely impossible take out a 
representative sample, but see J. Alexander! 1982), Theoretical Logic in 
Sociology; R. Harre'(1981), Philosophical Aspects o f the Micro-Macro Problem 
in K. Knorr Cetina and A. Cicourel (eds.). Advances in Social Theory and 
Methodology: Toward an Integration of Micro- and Macro-sociologies. In law 
one could refer to the so-called ’law in context school’ which is inspired by 
Giddens as well as Luhmann and other more anthropological and sociological 
approaches. See F. Snyder 1990 and F.Snyder (eds.) 1993. See also G. 
Teubners 'Introduction to Autopoetic Law' from 1988 and Rasmussen 1986 and 
1994. Within international relations special attention should be drawn to W. 
Carlsnaes 1992. N. Onuf 1989. F. Kralochwil 1989.P. Katzenstein. J.Ruggie, J. 




























































































Constructivists, or as Keohane labelled them - reflective institutionalists - 
not only share a common critique of rationalism, but also a more positive 
understanding of how institutions shape actors. Quite clearly what these 
theorists are concerned with is not only the working and influence of 
formal organizations and their impact on politics, but just as much, the 
impact of informal rules and institutions as well as historical practices on 
actors identities and world views. At the same time institutions or 
structures are not only seen as constraining actor-choices but equally as 
providing choice opportunities. Peter Hall defines the influence of 
institutional factors on action in the following manner:
"On the one hand, the organization of policy-making affects the 
degree of power that any one set of actors has over the policy 
outcomes... On the other hand, organizational position also 
influences an actors definition of his own interests, by establishing 
his institutional responsibilities and relationships to other actors. In 
this way, organizational factors effect both the degree of 
pressure an actor can bring to bear on policy and the likely 
direction of that pressure"(Hall in Steinmo, Thelen & Longstreth 
1992 p.3).
Unlike the rationalist conception of institutions, this perspective sees 
institutions as extremely important for individual preference-formation 
and for the on-going shaping of actors goals and strategies. In other 
words, actors certainly pursue goals but the formulation of these will be a 
result of 'making sense' of institutional processes including the attitudes, 
roles and recognition of other actors present in the setting. In fact most 




























































































'rationally' - on the basis of habits and well-known routines. As Thelen 
and Steinmo put it: "...people don't stop at every choice they make in their 
life and think to themselves, "Now what will maximize my self-interest?" 
Instead, most of us, most of the time, follow socially defined rules, even 
when doing so may not be directly in our self-interest"(Thelen & Steinmo 
1993 p. 8). And as Powell & DiMaggio have argued: "The constant and 
repetitive quality of much organized life is explicable not simply by 
reference to individual, maximizing actors but rather by a view that 
locates the persistence of practices in both their taken-for-granted quality 
and their reproduction in structures that are to some extend self- 
sustaining"(DiMaggio & Powell 1991 p. 9; See also Knorr-Cetina 1988 
p.30-31)21. ]n other words, in this institutional perspective man is 
regarded as a fundamentally 'social creature'. Meaningful - or if you wish 
'rational' action will, as also March & Olsen have argued, be what is seen 
as 'appropriate' behavior at any given point in time - implying a rather 
radical rejection of the rational-institutionalist assumption that the precise 
implications of self-interest is the same for everyone can be established 
outside time and space(March & Olsen 1984 p. 743, 1989 Ch. 2; see also 
the discussion in Wildavsky 1994 p.131-159; Grenstad & Selle 1995 p.5- 
27)22. Social actors - whether individuals or states - are not isolated atoms
21 As K. Knorr-Cetina puts it: "Frequently, participants prefer to forgo arguable 
rights in order not to damage their social relations. It is also clear that rules which 
fit the case may be made up 'as we go along"'(Knorr-Cetina 1988:31).
22 March & Olsen have suggested the following distinction between the rational and 
teflectivist conception of human ontology:
Anticipatory action: Obligatory action:
1. What are my alternatives ? 1. What kind of situation is this ?
2. What are my values ? 2. Who am 1 ?
3. What are the consequences 3. How appropriate are different




























































































but exist and relate to others in a world of meaning. With Peter 
Katzenstein: "Norms reflect premises. Their importance lies not in being 
true or false but in being shared. For these premises create themselves the 
evidence that confirm their validity" (Katzenstein 1990 p. 17). As 
Kratochwil points out such a position has important both epistemological 
and methodological implications:
"...human (and state) action in general is rule-governed...with the 
exception of pure reflexes or unthinking conditioned behavior - it 
becomes understandable against the background of norms embodied 
in conventions and rules which give meaning to an action. Thus, not 
only must an actor refer to rules and norms when he/she wants to 
make a choice, but the observer, as well, must understand the 
normative structure underlying the action in order to interpret and 
appraise choices. Norms are therefore not only 'guidance devices', 
but also the means which allow people to pursue goals, share 
meanings, communicate with each other, criticize assertions, and 
justify actions"(Kratochwil 1989 p.l 1; see also Kratochwil 1982 
p. 1-30).
As it should be clear by now, a constructivist institutionalist position 
draws on a large group of theorists who in several ways have influenced it 
and who share a common understanding of the co-constitution of agents 
and structures. However, Anthony Giddens should be given special 
attention because he, to my knowledge, is the only one who has developed 
an explicit causal theory of social change based on a micro-sociological
4. Choose the alternative that has 4. Do what is appropriate, 
the best consequences.




























































































understanding of institutions(but see also Harre' 1981 ;Knorr-Cetina 
1988). As rationalist scholars tell us over and over again: a strong theory 
of action need solid microfoundations.
As we shall see shortly, the main trust of Giddens' theory is not only that 
knowledgeable actors are influenced by structural properties in their, as it 
were, strategy-design but also that they as Giddens explains, in their 
pursuit and action - without intending it will produce effects that they 
would never have been able to account for in the first place.
To start at a quite basic level, it is a fundamental constructivist 
contention that whereas the natural sciences at least to some extend have 
been able to establish laws on the basis of empirical observations, this 
cannot nor should be the ideal for the social sciences. One of the most 
important reasons for this is as Giddens notes that:”..the causal conditions 
involved in generalizations about human social conduct are inherently 
unstable in respect of the very knowledge (or beliefs) that actors have 
about the circumstances of their own action...The theories and findings of 
the social sciences cannot be kept wholly separate from the universe of 
meaning and action which they are about(Giddens 1985 p. xxxii; see also 
Hollis & Smith 1991). This, however, should not prevent social scientists 
from creating what has often been referred to as 'middle-range-theory'. 
The important difference between the natural and social sciences is also 
revealed in the distinction between regulative and constitutive rules. This 
distinction is furthermore fundamental for understanding Giddens’ theory 
of social change and thus of the link between micro and macro 
perspectives. Rules are, in our common-sense conception of them related 




























































































understanding of the way in which we as social beings draw on rules in 
our day-to-day practices. As hinted at above, rules are, at a very 
fundamental level, essential to our making sense of the world. We rely on 
rules in order to reduce complexity and they tell us how to 'go on', as 
Wittgenstein has made explicit. This obviously means that there is more to 
rules than their sanctioning quality. They also constitute meaning. As 
drawn to our attention by Kratochwil above, we know this from the 
functioning of rules in all types of games, for instance in chess or football. 
The rules in these games do not only consist of prescriptions that punish 
players when formalized structures are transgressed but also consist of 
rules that tells us what 'counts' as what in the game itself. These rules 
constitute the game so to speak and can accordingly best be labelled 
'constitutive' rules. There will, in fact, be no game at all if there are no 
such rules 'making sense' of the whole thing. The language philosopher, 
John Searle, puts the distinction between the two rule-types in this 
manner: "...regulative rules can usually be paraphrased in the form 'Do 
X', or 'If Y, do X'. Some constitutive rules will have this character but 
most will have the form ’X counts as Y’, or ’X counts as Y in context 
C"(Searle 1969 p.35). The distinction is also found in H.L.A Harts 
opposition between primary and secondary rules - Hart being heavily 
influenced by the philosophy of language in developing his 'concept of 
law'(Hart 1961 p.91-92; see also Onuf 1989 p.35-65). As Giddens points 
out, the difference between the two rule-types should, however, never be 
overemphasized because rules characterized as primarily constitutive will 
have sanctioning elements in them and the opposite goes for those rules 




























































































invoke strong constitutive elements(Giddens 1985 p. 20). The plot in this 
story of rules is of course that constitutive rules are crucial - not only to 
games - but to all social behavior. We simply could not act - at least not 
meaningfully - outside a constitutive structure. Alexander Wendt has put it 
this way:
"Institutions are fundamentally cognitive entities that do not exist 
apart from actors' ideas about how the world works. This does not 
mean that institutions are not real or objective, that they are 
'nothing but’ beliefs. As collective knowledge, they are experienced 
as having an existence over and above the individuals who happen to 
embody them at the moment'. In this way, institutions come to 
confront individuals as more or less coercive social 
facts.."(Wendt 1992 p. 399).
It is exactly the change and production of these 'collective world views' 
we as analysts of international transformation should be occupied with 
grasping. In international relations, a notion such as sovereignty only has 
existence because we know what it means cognitively, that is, only if there 
are rules signifying what it means to be sovereign in the first place. The 
same could be said of the exchange of diplomats between states - which is 
a fundamental institution in international society, and for instance for 
those intersubjective rules that define what it means to go to war or to 
sign an arms reduction treaty(Der Derian 1987; Dessler 1989; Bull 1977; 
Nardin 1983). Furthermore, if we relate this to the EU it implies that the 
institutional environment - the aquis communautaire - as it has evolved 
and gained meaning in its present form through practices of the states and 




























































































constrain and provide choice-opportunities. In other words, constitutive 
meaning structures are basic, but - and this is important - just as they for 
their existence are dependent on actors for their reproduction, they are 
also changeable. The transformation of historical practices and world 
views is, however, a very gradual process that calls for careful conceptual 
analysis (Onuf 1994 18-19). Giddens argues that exactly because 
constitutive rules in social life are transformative it is better to leave the 
'game' metaphor (games like football or chess rarely change their 
constitutive structure) and instead take a closer look at language. We can 
thus with great advantage compare the speaking or writing of a language 
with the relation between actors and structures in social life. Giddens calls 
this interplay 'the duality of structure' because the two elements are 
fundamentally inter-linked(Giddens 1985 p.25)23. Thus, when we speak a 
language we not only reproduce 'it' and its grammatical structure, but we 
also - constantly change it by applying new words or dropping old ones. 
However, this transformation often happens undeliberately(Giddens 1985 
p.24). To put it differently, we do not think about the effect on the overall 
grammatical structure of our language-use when we in our 
communication utilize some words or phrases instead of others. This point 
is in many ways the core in Giddens structuration theory because it 
illustrates that we can conceive of intentional or 'rational action' while at 
the same time work with an idea of social structure as a product of 
unintended consequences over time. This duality is a great achievement
23 More precisely the duality o f structure entails:'' the constitution of agents and 
structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena....(but), structural 
properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they 
recursively organize. Structure is not to be equaled with constraint but always 




























































































for social theory in general because actor and structure- explanations 
traditionally have been opposed to each other and seen as mutually 
exclusive24. Thus, in speaking we not only express something and thereby 
perform an (most often) intentional act, we also gradually transform the 
constitutive structure without thinking about it and without being able to 
control the overall effect of it. Consequently, through our discourse and 
material action we unintentionally create the condition for future acts. As 
Giddens puts it:
"The duree of day to day life occur as a flow of intentional action. 
However, acts have unintended consequences..and unintended 
consequences may systematically feed back to be the 
unacknowledged conditions of future acts Thus one of the regular 
consequences of my speaking or writing English in a correct way is 
to contribute to the reproduction of the English language as a whole. 
My speaking English correctly is intentional; the contribution I 
make to the reproduction of the language is not"(Giddens 1985 p.8).




-* |reflexive monitoring of action unintended 
consequences of 
action25f. rationalization of action
24 For a general very illuminating discussion of this problem, see Alexander, 
Giescn, Munch & Smelser (eds.), (1987).




























































































Furthermore, the conditions for future acts that Giddens talks about, will 
by the actors be perceived of as some kind of new 'objective reality' that 
they will try to make sense of and accordingly react to in a knowledgeable 
way. They become the new background-conditions for action. What a 
constructivist perspective stresses is thus on the one hand the inability of 
human agents to fully control the overall implications of their actions and 
on the other, actors continuous 'afterrationalization' or legitimation of 
often unintended developments. This notion will characterize dense 
institutional settings in particular, but can be generalized to most of social 
life. It is probably also important to stress that such a constructivist 
conception of social change departs from more voulentaristic 'learning- 
models' as promoted by Ernst Haas or Alexander Wendt(see Wendt 1992; 
1994). In talking about anarchy being 'what states make of it', Wendt 
focuses far too much on change in state-identities as something actors 
choose as they please. From the constructivist position adopted here on the 
other hand, change in identities always happens in reference to historical 
structures that constrain as well as create choice-opportunities. This point 
is also emphasized by Knorr-Cetina below in her idea of action as an 
'getting on with our business’ in reference to past experiences:
"..it makes reference to the in-principle infinite regress of 
background assumptions which inform social behavior. None of 
these assumptions ...is fully interpreted (acknowledged MW),that is, 
can be rewritten into statements whose truth is context-independent 
...Yet to get on with ones business, some of these assumptions must 
always be taken as face value and 'held constant’ in the process of 
interpretation(action MW). Thus there are no fully interpreted 




























































































basis of further assumptions which are taken for granted for the 
time being"(Knorr-Cetina 1988 p. 31).
This point is extremely interesting when we try to make sense of the 
European integration process as it has evolved. It might just illuminate 
how and why gradual changes, for instance increased power in one sphere 
over time - and perhaps after some resistance - may be conceived as 'a 
new objective reality’ by actors in the system. This in spite of the fact that 
such change was never originally intended or even wanted. Obviously 
such a institutionalist perspective also fundamentally questions the idea so 
well known in efficiency models of political science and microeconomic 
theory - not to mention international relations theory - that institutional 
processes and policy outcomes will necessary lead to some kind of 
'balance' or equilibria(see March & Olsen 1989 p.5-6: see also Stone 1992 
p. 159-60).
It is in other words important to stress that this analytical 
framework makes it possible to hold on to an idea of rational actors 
pursuing goals - while at the same time emphasizing the fundamental
constitutive status of rules and meaning-structures in the definition and
1
change of such goals. A quit innovative insight considering the so familiar 
guerrilla war between actor and structure perspectives on world politics. 




























































































4 . 2 The Question of Power
An other point that simply cannot be over-stressed is the whole 
question of power. Giddens theory of the transformation of social systems 
would probably not be able to prove its fruitfulness at all if one stayed 
within the confines of a classical Hobbesian conception of power. This is 
indeed a challenge to mainstream IR. Thus, the often gradual 
transformation of institutions is intimately connected to changes in social 
empowerment - not only of the rules of the game as such, but also of 
power as roles. As Richard Ashley has put it:
"..the very status of an agent is not in any sense attributable to the 
inherent qualities or possessions of a given entity. Rather, the power 
and status of an actor depends on and is limited by the conditions of 
its recognition within a community as a whole. To have power, an 
agent must first secure its recognition as an agent capable of having 
power...It is always by way of performance in reference...to 
collectively 'known' (structures), that actors gain recognition and 
are empowered"(Ashley 1986 p. 291-292).
If the link between practice, legitimacy and power seems a little abstract 
we might rush to think of an example related directly to the IR.-field: the 
birth of the European states-system at the Peace of Westphalia. As John 
Ruggie and others have made explicit on several occasions, the 
transformation from a mediaeval hierarchical structure to a decentralized 
state-system certainly did not happen overnight but gradually and as an 
unintended result of actors changed practices, roles and power 




























































































(and in fact also after) the final breakdown of the hierarchical power 
structure of the Roman Empire, discursive as well as more material fights 
over who had what rights and roles were part of the daily 'order'(Hinsley 
1966;Wight 1977). Drawing on Giddens, Ruggie has argued that the 
transformation of the European society from the mediaeval to the modern 
state system was exactly about changes in power as legitimacy. As opposed 
to the conventional IR.-story - about power as wealth and military 
capability, Ruggie argues that; "The issue that was up for grabs during the 
transformation was not who had how much power, but who had the right 
to act as a power"(Ruggie 1989 p.28)26. Or as Andreas Behnke has put it 
also building on Giddensf'The exercise of power in human agency is 
inevitably liked to the application or employment of social rules which 
problematize any such exercise as 'legitimate', 'illegitimate', 'right' or 
'wrong'(Behnke 1993 p. 35). The ongoing constitution of society - 
domestic or international - happen through such 'deeds', as Nicholas Onuf 
puts it(Onuf 1994 p. 18; see also Stone 1992 p. 469-474)27. For our 
present context it is thus significant to notice that what we should look for 
when trying to keep track of possible transitions in legitimacy in Europe 
these years - is exactly changes in definitions of the 'correct' 
interpretation of roles and the overall rules of the game. One good 
example of this the experienced legitimacy of formal as well as informal 
EU-regulation. What does the changes in the governing-practices between
2 6 \iy  emphasis.
27 As Onuf puts it: "Every time agents choose to follow a rule, they change it - 
they strengthen the rule - by making it more likely that they and others will follow 
the rule in the future. Every time agents choose not to follow a rule, they change 
the rule by weakening it, and in so doing they may well contribute to the 




























































































the different actors and levels in the system indicate ? Another example is 
the ongoing debate about whether the EC/U should be deepened and/or 
widened. What type of actor is EU to become and where is one to place its 
'natural' outer borders ? Discursive 'fights’ take place all the time among 
scholars (and judges), politicians, intellectuals and technocrats just to 
mention a few core groups and might just give us an idea of new possible 
and more fundamental transitions.
Summing up before we go to the more concrete illustration of Giddens' 
theory, it should be stressed that the concept of power we have 
traditionally worked with in IR. often will be directly misleading when it 
comes to grasping these more subtle phenomena. The classical model 
should be - if not directly replaced - then at least supplemented with a 
more nuanced conception that conceives of power - and especially 
informal power - as a natural part of all social relations(Foucault 1977 
p.98)28.
In other words, one of the main reasons for the negligence of the political 
impact of institutions in mainstream IR.-literature is thus that theorists, 
steeped in a very simplistic Hobbesian cause-effect conception of power, 
see these - and I am here primarily thinking of manifest institutions in a 
world of anarchy - as per se powerless because they have no or very 
limited formal sanctioning capacity. Sanctioning power certainly is
28 As Foucault puts it: "..we should direct our researches on the nature of power 
not towards the juridical edifice of sovereignty, the State apparatuses and the 
ideologies which accompany them, but towards domination and the material 
operations of power, towards forms of subjugation and the inflections and 
utilisation's of their localized systems, and towards strategic apparatuses. We 
must eschew the model of Leviathan in the study of power. We must escape from 
the limited fields o f juridical sovereignly and Slate institutions, and instead 





























































































important in world politics as elsewhere. What IR. scholars tend to forget, 
however, is exactly the impact of the 'invisible' disciplinary power found 
in ongoing routines and day to day practices of institutional life. This is 
the case no matter whether we are talking about manifest or informal 
institutions and no matter whether we are concerned with domestic or 
international politics. Looking at power in this way would include not 
only the analysis of the working of rules, norms and procedures for 
correct and incorrect behavior in any organizational setting but also, as 
March & Olsen have argued, institutional reorganizations, hearing 
procedures, the invocation of technical jargon and organizational structure 
as such(March & Olsen 1984,1989).
In turning to the more concrete illustration of the usefulness of a 
constructivist perspective, it will hopefully become even clearer that what 
we ought to track down when studying European politics today is exactly 
changes in social empowerment and thereby in institutional rules and 





























































































5. European Legal Integration
- an Unintended Consequence of Rational State action ?
"What is needed is to tackle the more difficult task of imagining 
what forms of political domination are replacing the State and how 
they may be legitimating and consolidating themselves in the 
future".
(Schmitter 1991 p. 14)
In order to try to get an idea of whether what we are witnessing in 
Europe in recent years is in fact some kind of dispersion of power as 
legitimacy - away from the territorial states and towards other actors - 
we will have to look more closely at some crucial institutional aspects of 
the integration process. What 1 find to be of special importance in this 
respect is the development of Community norms and their reception at 
different levels in the system. The purpose of the following discussion is, 
however, somewhat broader in the sense that we will have to try to figure 
out whether we, inspired by the framework developed above, will be able 
to gain new theoretical insights into the dynamics of the process.
More to the point, 1 will in this section attempt to illustrate that this is, in 
fact, the case. Giddens' theory of unintended consequences of initially 
rational actions and his ideas of the recursive relationship between actors 
and structures, hold, I would argue, potential for explaining the somewhat 
contradictory but still interrelated developments that have characterized - 
and probably will continue to characterize European integration. As stated 
at the outset of this paper, the thesis will be that the integration process 




























































































order) has gone much further than what was (and perhaps still is) the 
original intention of the member-states. This has, I will argue, primarily 
been due to the fact that actors ability to control institutional processes is 
much more limited than what is assumed in rationalist approaches.
The Rome Treaty was - exactly just that - a 'treaty' like many others well 
known from international law(see Taylor 1991). However, although it has 
been - and still is - ignored by most IR. theorists and of course especially 
by intergovernmentalist approaches to European integration - 
Community laws, norms, rules and institutional practices - as they have 
evolved over time have changed the character of the Community and thus 
the state to state relations. There has been no - or very few - formal 
changes in the legal status of the original treaties but, when looking at the 
degree of Community-law-penetration into the domestic spheres of the 
member-states the effects have gone far beyond the type we normally 
attribute to a international legal arrangement. It is crucial to stress that the 
degree of formal regulation only captures the tip of the iceberg. Still the 
formal regulation alone has in its effects and especially its overall positive 
reception contributed to a significant transformation of the status and 
legitimacy of Community norms at all levels. As Weiler puts it:".... 
'constitutionalization'..to a large extent nationalized Community 
obligations and introduced on the Community level the habit of obedience 
and respect for the rule of law which traditionally is less associated with 
international obligations than national ones"(Weiler 1991 p.2 4 2 1-2422)29. 
This, however, has nothing what-so-ever to do with either harmony of 





























































































Garrett and many other rationalists would suggest). What it does indicate 
is, in line with the argument put forward in section 4, an un-unidirectional 
and contingent interplay between agents and structures in institutional 
processes together with a more subtle transformation of legitimacy and 
empowerment of new actors. An empowerment that nevertheless is diffuse 
and constantly challenged. As one scholar have suggested, one of the 
paradoxes of regulation in the EU as it has recently developed, is that 
those very states that have sought to pertain their sovereignty and accused 
the EU-bureaucracy for over-regulation, have been at the front-line in 
'asking' for more harmonization and regulation(Majone 1994 p.66)30. 
This paradox indicates that there must be some kind of discrepancy 
between the long-term strive of autonomy and the short-term quest for 
concrete problem solving.
What I am interested in in this context is, as noted above, the consequences 
of the normative embeddedness of the member-states for theorizing about 
European integration. In the following analysis 1 will argue that the 
penetration of EU legal norms into the member-states has tremendous 
consequences for the causal explanatory framework employed the by now 
conventional rationalist theories of policy-making in the Community. My 
argument will be that the normative process makes the bed rock of an 
rational-institutionalist position more and more unconvincing, that is, the 
argument that the member-states are - or even perceive themselves to be -
30 Majone notes that even though the opposite it often stated, the majority of 
suggestions for new regulations does not originate in the Commission but come 
from the Council and individual member states - together with the European 
Parliament and various interest groups. In fact Majone argues that only 6 per cent 
out o f 500 recent directives and regulations were what he calls 'spontaneous 




























































































left with a real choice of 'exit' - to utilize Weilers reference to 
'Hirshmann’s-distinction' between exit, voice and loyalty(see Weiler 1991 
p.2411; Hirschman 1970).
5.1 Sovereignty Revisited
It would probably also be in place already at this point to note that the 
position taken here differs in its microfoundations and, thus, in its causal 
explanatory line of argument from the analysis of the political impact of 
European legal integration, launched by Burley & Mattli(see Burley & 
Mattli 1993). In their 'Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of 
Legal Integration' they developed an analysis of European legal 
integration based on neofunctionalism. They especially put stress on the 
theory’s idea of what forces, above and below the state, actually enhance 
integration. However, in my view their story is both far too unidirectional 
and far too simple. What they launch is in fact a ‘conspiracy theory’ that 
directs our attention to the deliberate attempt - and success - of the ECJ to 
speed up integration thereby strengthening its institutional power and the 
professional prestige of the judges. In its straightforward cause - effect 
explanation the thesis is quite seductive - but as I will argue- relying with 




























































































too simple'. It should not be too difficult to see where our point of 
disagreement lies considering my anti-utilitarist reflective institutional 
point of departure(see section 4). It is also interesting to note how Burley 
& Mattli in their critique of Weiler's much more complex interpretation 
of the same process, glorify the simplicity of their own rational-choice­
like microfoundations. Not only do they invest quite some time stressing 
how the explanatory maxim in rational choice theory - 'individuals 
maximization of self-interest' - can be married with neofunctionalism, 
but they also (and again like our rational-institutionalist friends above) see 
a virtue in launching social science theories and explanations that are as 
'parsimonious' and general as possible(see Burley & Mattli 1993 p. 43- 
49)31. In sum, as it will become clearer below, one can say that I, in the 
present explication, ’defend' the contextualists against Burley & Mattli's 
purely interest-based analysis.
In the following attempt to show that integration has resulted in the 
change of some more basic rules of the game in European politics and that 
this, as Ruggie argued, has given the European construct a fundamentally 
different character, it will be fruitful to try to remind ourselves what has 
traditionally been implied by sovereign statehood. Sovereignty is of 
course an endlessly contested concept, the meaning of which changes 
depending on whom you ask. Neorealists - and intergovernmentalists - 
would thus claim that European integration has not so far implied any 
surrender of sovereignty because the term only - or at least at the end of 
the day - should be defined in security-terms. This argument has recently
31 Their main point of disagreement with rational-institutionalist explanations is 
thus whose rational interests is actually driving the integration process forward:




























































































been launched by Ole Waever in an article where he even contends to be 
able to solve the sovereignty puzzle in contemporary integration 
theory(Waever 1995). He furthermore argues that it is unfruitful to make 
a classical legal definition of sovereignty the basis for evaluating the 
degree of integration because it will be so easily falsifiable. Clearly, with 
such a point of view very few changes in European politics can be 
detected. Waever does suggest however, that what we should look for is 
not the dissolution of the states in Western Europe but changed meanings 
of sovereignty - and with this I certainly agree. In order to get an 
impression of the impact and reception of normative/legal regulation in 
different sectors at the national level it is thus useful to explicate how most 
up-to-date IR.-scholars (and probably also most lawyers) still define 
sovereignty - in the 1990's. Within legal theory one often refers to the 
legal positivist John Austin (1832) when a classical conception of the status 
of the sovereign vis-a-vis the legal international order, is to be 
established(See Austin 1954(1832) p. 201,347). Austin would agree 
completely with a rational-institutionalist position in that it would be a 
contradiction in terms to argue that sovereignty can be divided. The 
source of law can only be the particular sovereign. This implies of course 
that power and territory must be closely linked(see also MacCormik 1993 
p. 16). However, it is not only among deceased legal positivists and 
modern rational choice people we encounter such a conception of 
sovereignty. The IR. scholar James Mayall (an English school 
representative) is a good example of this. He has recently argued that a 




























































































within the state and no one above it”(Mayall 1990 p. 19). Four elements 
are, as he sees it, required in order for a state to call itself sovereign:
1) States equal and independent status in international society.
2) States ability and possibility to be self-policing, which means that 
there should be a monopoly on law-making and a monopoly on the 
use of force in as well as outside the state-border.
3) Territoriality will be closely connected to the state as an actor.
4) Non-intervention from other states or organizations in the states 
internal affairs.
Not very surprisingly, looking at Europe today not many of these 
requirements are fulfilled at the member-state level. Nor would the 
definition fit the EU as a whole, however.
5.2 The Unintended Constitutionalization of EU Law
It might seem almost blasphemous in a short section like this even to 
attempt to say anything meaningful about the impact of EU-law and norms 
on European integration. Several competent books have been and are 
continuously written on this highly complex topic(see Snyder 1990,
Snyder (eds.) 1993; Dehousse (eds.) 1994; Rasmussen 1986,1994). With 
solid help from Joseph Weiler (1981,1991,1994) and others I shall 
nevertheless try to show why it is true to say that EU law and normative 




























































































the member-states than was originally expected by the contracting parties. 
The purpose of this rather short elaboration will be twofold. Firstly, with 
direct reference to my introduction to stress the insufficiency of those 
political science approaches to European integration that discards the legal 
dimension. Secondly, to emphasize the empirical limitations of those IR. 
theories of integration where intergovernmental bargains are given sole 
explanatory status. An implicit agenda is thus to demonstrate the relevance 
of a more sociological approach to integration. It is in other words 
important to note that what I seek here is nor to approximate any in depth 
description of the recent development in European union law.
If we take a short glance at the original Treaty of Rome it becomes 
quite clear that even though the founding fathers talked about the 
development towards an 'ever closer union of the European people', the 
Treaty resembled most of all a traditional economic agreement concluded 
between sovereign states under international law. Several 'sovereignty- 
protecting measures’ were explicated for instance the 'legality-principle' 
(art.4) which was meant to secure that all laws issued by the Community 
should originate directly in the Treaty(Rasmussen 1993 p.lff). What does 
this mean ? It means that there was nothing in the treaties that anticipated 
the development of a case-law-based constitutional system as has been the 
actual result of 40 years of practice by the European Court of Justice. 
However, apart from the Court-produced case-law (which tends to be 
what lawyers always focus on because it is so easily traceable empirically), 
the EU legal system now contains several unwritten constitutional 




























































































EU's most important and most basic constitutional principles are not to be 
found in the treaties; nor are they to be found in writing anywhere 
else"(Rasmussen 1994 p. 2 8 0 - 2 8 1 ) 3 2 .1 win get back to some of these by 
now basic constitutional principals below.
One of the most striking things about the normative development of 
the EU for a political scientist - or at least for an IR. scholar - is of course 
its consequences for national sovereignty(see section 3). It can in fact be 
argued that IR. - as an independent social science discipline - is identical 
with this single principle (Onuf 1989; Bartelson 1995; Wind 1996a; Wind 
forthcoming). Weiler have argued that the depth and formality of this 
process, including the changed perceptions of correct and incorrect 
behavior by national actors on different levels, has resulted in what he 
calls 'a closure of selective exit’ for the member-states. Perhaps not 
formally - but in practical terms. However, the reason why no (or so 
extremely few) political scientists have found it worth while paying 
attention to the radicalness of the legal development for national 
sovereignty and consequently for the applicability of a pure 
intergovernmentalist approach to integration, can perhaps be traced to the 
fact that the 'hardening' of Community law into more and more binding 
regulation - historically - coincided with a parallel fragmentation - or an 
increase in 'voice' - in the political sphere in the 1960's. The latter was 
exactly what political scientists have paid attention to. Such a narrow 
perspective obviously doesn't give a satisfactory explanation of what 
actually happened. When looking for changes in loyalty and thereby in the 
social empowerment of new political actors in the system over time, the




























































































parallel development in the political and legal sphere is more than just 
puzzling. It thus becomes necessary to try to figure out - firstly, what 
actually took place in the two spheres from the 1960's onwards and 
secondly how and why the increased normative binding came to be 
accepted at the national level in the first place. It is certainly possible to 
argue with Burley & Mattli that the intensity and depth of normative-legal 
integration has been caused by legal activism of ECJ. But - as noted above
- I find this explanation far too straightforward. In line with the 
constructivist position outlined above I will argue, that what we are 
dealing with here is a much more subtle recursive process. Even though 
the development in legal integration was not expected or even wanted by 
the member-states, they have to a large extent - though perhaps implicitly
- 'made new sense’ of this normative binding. It would be completely 
wrong to hold that such 'new sense' resulted from a Big Bang harmony of 
interest (as would be argued by neofunctionalism) where states 
deliberately endorsed the direction of the process. Nor is there any 
evidence that the states - even though they objected to several ECJ-rulings
- have tried to limit the power of the Court through changes in the Treaty. 
Looking at other norm-producing institutions such as the Commission and 
EU-agencies, this picture doesn't change. As noted above, in spite of the 
fact that member states have publicly critizied the Commission for being 
almost obsessed with detail-regulation in several areas and consequently 
left little self-determination to the national and sub-national level, this 
'demand for detail' has to a very large extend come from the member 
states themselves. One of the main reasons for this rather paradoxical 




























































































120/78) which provided for the mutual recognition clause. The 
implication of the Cassis was thus, that in stead of costly and bureaucratic 
harmonization measures in preparation for the single market, all member 
states were obliged to let goods accepted in the country of origin have 
unlimited and undiscriminatory access to market of all other member 
states. The more developed member states, with for instance a higher 
product-safety policy, feared that the mutual recognition principle would 
lower the health and safety standards in Europe altogether because 
products with lower standards would be purchasable in all member states - 
most often to a much lower price. This thus made more developed 
member states in particular favour more detailed and much stricter old- 
style harmonization instead of the more market-based deregulatory mutual 
recognition approach (see Alter & Meunier-Aitsahalia 1994). An other 
reason why many member states have supported detailed harmonization- 
measures instead of mutual recognition was the belief that more detail - 
because of the higher degree of specification -would hinder to wide 
'interpretation-gaps' between the countries (Majone 1995).
There thus seems to be something contradictory in the member 
states' rather smooth acceptance of the normative binding - least if one 
adopts a rational-institutional framework were states are expected 
jealously to guard their independence and at the same time seek cost- 
efficiently to maximize their individual utility. Weiler summarizes this 
paradox in the following manner:
"Although the governments of the member states of the European
Community (EC) have always had a principal role in fashioning




























































































European Court of Justice played a key role in imposing a 
compliance regime with these norms that has resembled in its 
structure and rigour the constitutional order of a federal state. To 
an extent unprecedented in other international organisations, states 
have found themselves locked into this regime and unable to enjoy 
the more common international legal compliance latitude. 
Interestingly, member state courts, legislatures, and governments 
seemed, by and large, to accept the new constituuonal regime 
'imposed' by the European Court with a large measure of 
equanimity - a veritable 'quit revolution'(Weilerl994 p. 510).
To put it differently, is it at all possible - theoretically - to explain the 
member-states endorsement of such an unprecedented constitutionalization 
that - as Keohane and Hoffmann have noted:" has gone farthest in limiting 
national autonomy"33 than any other individual part of the community 
system ? If states really want to preserve their autonomy why did they in 
fact accept the radical juridical activism of the ECJ ? Why made them 
adopt the many unwritten constitutional principles that were never 
originally in the treaties but which never the less limits their autonomy 
considerably for instance by making EU-law directly applicable and even 
supreme inside their own state-border ? And why have the member states 
subsequently accepted their own national courts and national 
administrative systems readiness to co-operate with the Court and the 
Commission in this process ?
For political scientists it might not be quite clear what the 
implications of a 'constitutionalization' of EU law are. I will not go too 
much into the details here, but a few core concepts should be highlighted.




























































































What is important is that although the EU, as 1 emphasized above, like any 
other international organization - originally was - and indeed still is - 
based on an international treaty (and not a constitution), EU law has over 
the years - through the development of the ECJ's case-law - developed 
from resembling classical international law and come to look more and 
more like the type of law that we normally attribute to federal 
states(Rasmussen 1986, 1993, 1994). Two concepts - taken together - 
account for this: 'the doctrine of direct effect'(van Gend en Loos 26/62) 
and 'the supremacy clause' (Costa v. Enel 6/64). As Weiler makes clear 
there is nothing new in the doctrine of direct effect in itself as compared 
to classical international law. All international law is - at least in principle 
- directly applicable, the caveat being that in classical international law, 
states decide themselves whether they wish to incorporate it into the 
domestic legal order - and abide by it. This is not the case in the EU as it 
looks today, not so much because of the direct effect in itself as in its 
combination with the 'supremacy clause'. Unlike in federal constitutions 
there were no written references to supremacy or direct effect in the 
original treaties of the Communities. The clauses were both established by 
case-law and legitimized through the political objectives of the internal 
market. Supremacy implies the following:
"In the sphere of application of Community law, any Community 
norm, be it an article of the treaty..or a minuscule administrative 
law regulation enacted by the Commission, 'trumps' conflicting 
national law, whether enacted before or even after the Community 




























































































Even though both the Italian Courte Constituzionale, the French Conseil 
d'Etat and - as G.F Mancini notes "a couple of English law lords” - 
initially fought against the supremacy doctrine rendering it 
unconstitutional, it was nevertheless only a few years later fully 
accepted(Mancini 1991 p. 180-181). As Weiler points out, it is at this 
point that the full implications of the doctrine of direct effect becomes 
clear. As opposed to classical international law where the parliament in a 
member state, if it is dissatisfied with a certain provision, can set it aside 
by either legislating against it or just not implementing it, this has become 
impossible in the Community legal order due to the supremacy clause. 
This means that any Community ruling - because of the doctrine of direct 
effect - will automatically become part of the member states legal order, 
whether the member state's parliament like it or not. As Weiler puts 
it:"Parallels to this kind of constitutional architecture may only be found 
in the internal law of federal states"(ibid.). Still, this is not all there is to 
say about the constitutionalization of the European legal process. The 
effect of the supremacy clause and the doctrine of direct effect could not 
have obtained the present influence on national legal orders had it not 
been for three additional elements: the ECJ's alliance with individuals, 
with national courts and - as noted above - without the unique passiveness 
of member state governments. The effectiveness of community law has 
especially been due to the first two elements, while the governments 
reaction/or lack thereof - can be seen as an important underlying 
background condition. That EC law have become the 'law of land' has in 




























































































refuse to implement it34. If member states either do not fulfil or directly 
violate Community law, individuals who might be effected by a violation 
or non-implementation may take their own governments to court. And as 
Weiler puts it: "Here we are faced with a bald political fact: A member 
state - in our Western democracies - cannot disobey its own 
courts "(Weiler 1994 p.515). Burley & Mattli have described the 
radicalness of this development:
"By 1965, a citizen of a community country could ask a national 
court to invalidate any provision of domestic law found to conflict 
with certain directly applicable provisions of the treaty. By 1975, a 
citizen of an EC country could seek the invalidation of a national law 
found to conflict with self-executing provisions of community 
secondary legislation, the 'directives' to national governments passed 
by the EC Council of Ministers. And by 1990, community citizens 
could ask their national courts to interpret national legislation 
consistently with community legislation in the face of undue delay in 
passing directives on the part of national legislators"
(Burley & Mattli 1993 p. 42).
However, as hinted at above, individual access to invocation of community 
law would not have been effective had not the national courts also been 
willing to co-operate. The important article here is Art. 177, which makes 
it possible (and in several instances even obligatory) for a national court - 
in any question of doubt of a national law's status in relation to the EC 
legal order - to set it aside and ask for a preliminary ruling from the 
ECJ. The ECJ will then consider whether the national law is or is not
3^The Treaty of the European Union now makes it possible for the Court to 




























































































consistent with the EC-treaty. In recent cases like Simmertal (106/77), 
Blaizot (24/86) and Francovich (joined cases C-6 & C-9/9) the Courts 
power to review even national constitutional law were further 
institutionalized(see Rasmussen 1994; more generally Shapiro & Stone 
1994). Because the national courts over the years in fact incorporated all 
ECJ rulings into the law of the land, both the direct and indirect impact 
has been immense. The importance of letting the national court - and not 
an 'international super-Leviathan' - like the ECJ - be the practical 
guardian of EC law can hardly be overestimated(Weiler 1993). The 
collaboration between the ECJ and the national courts has in effect been 
integrated into what Weiler calls: "a unitary system of juridical 
review"(Weiler 1994 p.515). The important thing to stress is thus that the 
national courts adopted the ECJ rulings with very little hesitation(see also 
Weiler 1981). In order to get a complete picture of the domestication of 
Community norms and obligations and of the normative embeddedness of 
the EC system in general, one should of course also stress the influence of 
the Commission and its increasing use of soft-law (recommendations, 
communications and so on) in regulating in areas not covered by the 
Treaty - through Art 235^5 in questions of doubt as to whether the 
Commission actually 'had the right' to interfere and regulate a given issue, 
the case could be brought before the Court and there be either rejected or 
confirmed. In this way the Commission have often 'used' the Court to get 
a 'blue print' for new regulatory initiatives. One legal scholar has noted 
that since 1972, the ECJ has in more than 500 instances, extended the 35




























































































Community competence though this provisionné. Together with the 
increase in majority voting with the SEA and Maastricht, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to hold on to the contention that the 'exit' 
possibilities and thereby also sovereignty, as is conventionally understood 
in IR. theory, has not been radically effected by this development.
What is interesting here is thus not so much that the individual 
governments, if they had truly wanted to, could not have convinced their 
courts (and administrations) to be more nationalistic in their juridical 
practices or that governments could not have argued for a politicization of 
the ECJ - implying for instance that judges be politically nominated in the 
future - like in the US. The interesting tiling is exactly that this has not 
happened. As Weiler puts it: "..the Court's rulings are as significant as 
any constitutional change introduced in the Single European Act or the 
Maastricht Treaty. One could have expected some fierce opposition"(Ibid. 
p. 516). Furthermore, as Burley and Mattli show in their article and as I 
tentatively hinted at in section 2 in my critique of the rational- 
institutionalists explanation of the ECJ, the governments did in fact in 
several instances object strongly to the ECJ's provisions. However, all 
examples show that over time the same governments accepted the rulings 
and simply came to regard them as the 'new order of the day'(Burley & 
Mattli 1993 p.51).
The relative and apparent passiveness of governments and their implicit 
willingness to accept even a closure of 'selective exit' without taking any 
measures against the ECJ, is thus difficult to comprehend wearing 
conventional IR.-glasses. 36




























































































When studying European integration, lawyers and political scientists have 
- as Weiler quite correctly stresses and as I noted briefly above - seen two 
completely different 'realities'. The political scientists - focusing on the 
'power-politics' of the Council concluded that we were faced by a clear 
move towards intergovernmentalism in the 1960s and 1970s. The 
Luxembourg crisis in 1965/66 being perhaps the most glaring example(see 
Hoffmann 1966). No one would argue that we witnessed serious crisis in 
the Council in this period, where DeGaulle, after a breakdown in 
negotiations over the CAP, the EC-budget and perhaps especially majority 
voting in the Council, paralysed the political decision making process by 
refusing to let his ministers participate in any legislation for 6 months.
The result was the famous Luxembourg compromise in January 1966 
where it was decided that states could veto any legislation that impinged 
on a member states so-called 'vital interests'. However, when trying to 
make sense of the integration process in the late 1960's and onwards a 
narrow focus on the political crisis in the Council far from catches the 
entire picture. If we move to the lawyers analysis of the integration 
process on the other hand, the world looks probably far too rosy. Many 
EC lawyers came to the scholarly study of the European Community with 
a training in international (and not domestic) law. What they saw was a 
normative integration that went far beyond anything seen previously in 
their former field and many lawyers characterized the development in 
Community law in the 1960's and 1970's as the 'Heroic' Period'(Weiler 
1991 p. 2428). What is interesting about these insights, however, is not so 
much that lawyers and political scientists disagree - there is not much new 




























































































sees it - not (as suggested by Burley & Mattli in their 'conspiracy 
theory’) any simple causal relation between the contradictory 
developments in the legal and political spheres in this period. In line with 
the reflective institutional theory of transformations in social systems, one 
can see European integration as a product of conscious bargains among 
heads of states as well as an unintended and uncontrollable normative 
process(see also Eisele 1992 p.29-58)37. As Weiler puts it:
"Instead of a simple (legal) cause and effect and (political) effect, 
this subtler process was a circular one. On this reading, the 
deterioration of the political supranational decisional procedures, 
the suspension of majority voting in 1966, and the creation and 
domination of intergovernmental bodies such as COEPER and the 
European Council constituted the political conditions that 
allowed the Member States to digest and accept a process of 
constitutionalization. Had no veto power existed, had 
intergovernmentalism not become the order of the day, it is not 
clear to my mind that the Member States would have accepted 
with such equanimity what the European Court of Justice was 
doing"(Weiler 1991 p. 2428-2429).
It seems, however, that Weiler here in fact does invoke a typical 
'equilibrium' explanation for institutional developments. This in spite of 
his - at least implicit - emphasis on recursiveness. When he argues that the 
dynamics in the one sphere was dependent on the
development/fragmentation in the other, no changes in state identities and
37 T. D. Eisele has in his revealing piece on Wittgenstein and legal theory, 
argued, that the Common law in particular was developed in such a 'learning' - 




























































































interests or in social empowerment can have taken placets. From a 
constructivist point of departure such a conclusion is problematic. It seems 
more convincing to argue that even though states perceived (and probably 
still perceive) themselves to be guarding the integration process they had 
in fact 'incorporated' the reduced possibility of exit into their own action- 
choices. It is thus possible to see the normative integration as legitimizing 
new practice-rules and norms and that these over time had a significant 
impact on the character of inter-state bargaining itself. As also noted 
above, had there been no such changes in legitimacy and social 
empowerment one could indeed have expected that the member states 
when they fully realized that legal development had gone further than 
what was originally expected, would have tried to do something about it - 
for instance politicize the ECJ.
As Weiler argues in his article from 1994, several normative issues 
are at stake. They certainly make it difficult to work with simple causal 
explanations - whether neofunctionalist or rational-institutionalists - both 
firmly committed to utilitarist interest-analysis. A suggestive explanation 
would include rflexion on the following issues:
l)The status of law as something sacred that can not be criticized: 
Both in trying to understand the national courts and the government's 
reception of formal as well as informal legal integration, the status of law 
in the European tradition, should not be underestimated. Law - in general 
- but especially practice-based case-law is about the production of norms 
through legitimation, reconfirmation and interpretation of the past(See 
Yablon 1992 p.249-264). As Weiler argues: *




























































































"Legal formalism retains a very substantial power in European 
jurisprudence, and the overall content of the ECJ jurisprudence 
seemed (or must have seemed) to reflect a plausible reading of the 
purposes of the treaty to which the member states had solemnly 
adhered"(Weiler 1994 p. 521).
2) 'We better do what everybody else does' - 'Judicial Cross- 
Fertilisation': Also this is about the 'authority of law’.There was a 
'trend' in European national courts to comply with ECJ rulings and 
to utilize Art. 177. Though not without hesitation. The tendency to 
allow supranational courts to interfere in domestic affairs 'must' 
also, I would argue, explain at least to some extent the governments 
relative passiveness.
3) Furthermore, the readiness to accept the ECJ and supranational 
law- making in general might very well have to do with Western 
European culture. In the Western European democratic tradition the 
idea of the separation of powers has given courts, and law more 
generally, a privileged objective status. This clearly differs from the 
role and status of the US Supreme Court, however. In many 
European legal traditions, jurdical review and generally the political 
aspect of litigation have been less common39. The 'politics' of the 
ECJ might have benefited from this.
A full picture of changes in power as legitimacy and an eventual 
'Transformation of Europe' will however have to include several 
additional elements. Apart from the need to go more into depth with the 
reception of the legal aspects of integration including the derived effects
39 This differs probably between those countries which have constitutional courts 
and those that don't. To this comes that some European countries, for instance 




























































































on rules, norms and practices at all levels - an analysis of domestic as well 
as external constrains at the international level.will of course have to be 
included. To this comes more careful studies of the role of the 
Commission and the often unintended reciprocal interplay between the 
Commission and the Court(see Snyder 1993 p.9)40.
The impossibility of explaining normative developments from rationalist 
models is well known. However, rationalist approaches would neither 
provide us with any innovative suggestions as to where the whole 
integration process might end up. From a conventional theoretical point of 
view, very few changes can in fact be detected. Not everyone in the IR. 
field endorses this view, however. According to Ole Wasver what we are 
experiencing in Europe is:
” .... not just confusion, but a logical confusion. The key variable, 
the organizing abstraction - territorial sovereignty - has lost its 
grip, and all the concepts hinging on it are sliding, too. This does not 
necessary mean that all International Relations theory is falling with 
it. It only means that we have to be extremely careful in sorting out 
the elements that are bound (by this specific configuration), and those 
that are more general (even if not universal and totally 
transhistorical)”(Waever 1991 p.3).
40 Adopting Giddens thesis o f the relative autonomy of institutions and the 
processes of recursiveness. Snyder stresses in particular this point in following 
manner: "The interaction between the Commission and the European courts is 
not...merely a process o f reciprocity. Instead it is recursive: it involves the 
reproduction of both institutions and norms, and the processes o f reproduction 
occur in and by means of practices which arc organised by these institutions and 





























































































"..post- 1992 EC will not be...at least not for the foreseeable future 
a nation with a supraordinate sense of identity, rooted in common 
symbols and experiences...It will (neither) be ..a state, at least not 
in the strict sense of the term..that uniquely controls the 
concentrated means of coercion within a given territory, that 
exclusively claims the right to control the movement of people and 
goods across its boundaries...Ergo, the potential misleadingness 
of efforts to (re)interpret the EC as the concatenation and /or 
culmination of the historical process of state-building in 
Europe”(Schmitter 1991 p.2).
This essay has discussed the dynamic yet paradoxical interplay between 
what Joseph Weiler has termed 'decisional supranationalism' on the one 
hand and the 'constitutionalization' of the legal sphere in the European 
Community on the other(Weiler 1981, 1991). The two dimensions 
constitutes a theoretical puzzle for political scientists as well as for 
lawyers in that they describe the integration process as moving in 
completely opposite directions. If one focuses on the political sphere 
alone, the EC was increasingly intergovemmentalized from the mid 
1960's onwards and could thus best be characterized as a classical 
international organization. If we turn to the legal sphere of the 
Community on the other hand, the picture looks quite different. What we 
have witnessed here in the same period is a gradual but steady move from 
international to constitutional law. Lawyers and political scientists have 
thus envisioned two completely distinct European ’realities'.
The discussion above have put this paradox in a sociological perspective. 




























































































order to grasp the dynamic interplay between purposeful action in social 
systems and the often unanticipated effetcs of institutional developments 
when seen in historical perspective. The member-states quite clearly 
continue to have a lot to say in the bargaining processes of the European 
Community. They are and remain prominent (and most visible) actors. 
However, by merely focusing on what goes on at the strictly political level 
i.e. in the decision making/treaty-making processes, mainstream IR. 
approaches like intergovemmentalism, overlook the deviation between 
initial decisions and the unintended effects of these decisions when seen in 
historical perspective. What intergovemmentalist theories of European 
integration have neglected is what goes on in between the grand bargains 
such as the Rome Treaty, the SEA and Maastricht. When seen in historical 
perspective, unanticipated developments more often than not change the 
design of its original treaty-framers.
Theories that claim to be able to explain and understand 
transformations in social systems, should - at least try - to keep up with 
the empirical 'reality' that they seek to capture. Seen in this light, 
conventional IR.theories of European integration do not seem to have 
much to offer. The historical and unproblematized individualist 
microfoundations imply a simplistic and per se unchangeable concept of 
sovereignty is thus fundamentally unequipped to detect any kind of 
transformations in power as legitimacy. The question is, in other words, 
whether we in IR. as well as in other fields dealing with European politics 




























































































analytical frameworks - nice and simple as they may be - define the ideal 
of good social science ?
"...a comprehensive transformation of the European nation state 
will be possible only after major political struggles with uncertain 
outcomes...'governance' largely will involve winning peoples mind, 
of coaxing them towards different beliefs about possible and 
appropriate institutional alternatives...(T)he current process of 
European integration may represent a watershed in the history of the 
European nation state".
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